China’s leadership securer than thought

‘China’s leadership securer than thought’

Scholar says people’s complaints largely concern local governments, not central one

People tend to judge others through the lens of their own social, cultural and political fabrics, often making rash, uninformed conclusions. This is particularly risky when talking about a vast, complex society like China, said a leading China expert. 

It is undeniable that China’s incoming leader Xi Jinping will face people’s deepening grievances about social inequality, which some argue could precipitate a crisis of the central government’s legitimacy.

But Kim Heung-kyu, a politics and diplomacy professor at Sungshin Women’s University, has a cautious stance, pointing out that the central authority is more durable than outsiders may presume.

“From the perspective of the West, domestic challenges facing the Chinese leadership are ones their governments may not be able to withstand for long. They, thus, tend to predict the future of China through their own lens at the risk of misjudgment,” Kim told The Korea Herald.

Kim Heung-kyu, professor of Sungshin Women’s University (Kim Myung-sub/The Korea Herald)

“Most of the people’s complaints are not directly targeting the central government. They are in fact about the regional governments,” he explained, noting that the governance structure is different from that of the West.

Underscoring the balance of power among the political factions in the Communist Party’s top organs, Kim said that the decision-making process could be conservative for the time being despite Xi’s personal character.

He also noted that the next decade would be a “period fraught with uncertainties” when the U.S. would continue to maintain military superiority, but be surpassed by China as the world’s largest economy. Following are excerpts from the interview. 



Korea Herald: You mentioned in your research that people’s complaints are largely about provincial governments rather than the central government, meaning the government in Beijing is not as vulnerable as commonly thought.

Kim Heung-kyu: In the normal western governance structure, when people’s grievances and complaints grow, this may lead to a conflict with the central government, and then could result in a legitimacy crisis for the government. This structure is of two tiers ― the (central) government and society, or state and society.

However, in China’s case, it has a quite interesting structure due to the size of its land and population. It has the central government, provincial governments and then society. Thus, what people directly contact is the provincial governments, not the central one.

Within this structure, the central government steps in to help resolve the problems between the provincial authority and society. one example is that the central government once offered a solution to the medical security issue for those in a rural area while concurrently demanding the regional government shoulder a certain portion of the medical coverage in order to minimize people’s financial burden.

All this shows the central government’s durability is much greater than generally thought. From the perspectives of the West or Japan, domestic challenges facing the Chinese leadership are ones that their governments may not be able to withstand for long. They tend to predict the future of China through their own lens, which could lead to misjudgment. 

The Chinese government has more public support than generally thought. Despite this, it still remains to be seen how China, now, can weather its (domestic) crises. 

KH: What do you think about Xi Jinping’s domestic tasks for the next decade?

Kim: The foremost one may be narrowing the gap between haves and have-nots. The next is establishing a welfare system for the relatively vulnerable strata. Another is to turn its export-led economy into a domestic consumption-oriented one, and to make state corporations more efficient in that process. He also needs to ameliorate the current political system to make it more capable of accommodating the various demands of China’s increasingly pluralistic society. 

KH: What do you think China lacks among conditions to be a great power for now?

Kim: In light of international politics, one of the most important conditions to be a great power is recognition for its global status shared by other powers. Recognition is rarely given just because of its size or (hard, material) power. It comes along when it makes donations to enhance the public good, appeals to them with its own culture and charm. So, the mission left for Beijing is to garner recognition, but it will take much time, though.

KH: Can you explain the characteristics of the so-called fifth-generation leadership?

Kim: Strictly speaking, it is the 4.5 generation as it is a mixture of the fourth and fifth generations for the next five years. But to explain the fifth generation, they were born after the People’s Republic of China was established (in 1949), and they experienced the Cultural Revolution when they were in their teens ― at an impressionable age. They were also educated, benefiting from the country’s openness and reform. In this regard, they are leaders relatively free from former leader Mao Zedong’s ideological influences.

In some sense, the new leaders would have fears about any chaos or confusion due to the (bitter) memories of the revolution. Another characteristic may be that they received education in the humanities, which has made them more flexible and open, and capable to handle the structure of their (changing) society, which has become more pluralistic. This is comparable with their previous generations with backgrounds in natural sciences and engineering ― one feature of the socialist system.

With all these combined, the new leadership may be less ideologically skewed and understand the world better. Another is that the leadership structure features a balance of power among different cliques and factions in the Communist Party’s top organs.

KH: Because of the factional balance of power, would Xi Jinping have limited influence and room to maneuver in the power structure?

Kim: The system is not like one leader calling all the shots. Xi is like the first among equals. As the leadership consists of various factions, it would not be easy to push for new initiatives or policies immediately. In some sense, the structure can be seen as being conservative and resistant to new changes. The decision-making process could get more complicated, despite Xi’s personal character.

KH: What is your forecast on China’s foreign policy under Xi?

Kim: Xi has two very dramatic faces. one is he appears to have some flexibility and understand the outside word, their culture and state-to-state relations well. This is because he directly experienced poverty and tough physical labor during his life in a remote village during the Cultural Revolution. But, during most of his bureaucratic career, he served in economically vibrant coastal regions adjacent to the outside world, such as Fujian and Zhejiang provinces. 

Another face is that he has passion to underscore China’s intrinsic national interest as he is sort of a self-made figure, for which he has much self-esteem. I take great caution to make this prediction, but he could make a strong appeal as a national leader when conditions are met for this. In other words, there is the possibility that shifts in the depth of his action could be very substantial, compared with the country’s other leaders. To sum up, the country decision-making structure could be conservative, but once Xi consolidates his power, he could push for far stronger policy initiatives. 

KH: Do you think Hu Jintao will quickly hand over to Xi his chairmanship in the party’s Central Military Commission, which controls the armed forces?

Kim: In the case of former leader Jiang Zemin, he held sway over the military for some two years, even after handing the party’s general secretary title over to Hu Jintao. Given the unstable security landscape and intensifying maritime disputes, he could seek to control the military for some time, perhaps two years or so. However, taking into account the progress in the country’s efforts to institutionalize the power transition mechanism, there is also the possibility of him leaving the military soon. 

What is notable is Hu has recently appointed two CMC vice chairmen ― the slots allotted for military figures. It is common sense that the new members of the party at the 18th Communist Party Congress pick the two. My guess may soon prove wrong, but Hu might have placed the two in the second-highest CMC posts so as to maintain his clout over the military through them. Given this, Hu could leave the post soon.

But Xi himself is known to have considerable influence over the military. He served as secretary to then-Defense Minister Geng Biao in the 1980s, which enabled him to build ties with the military. He is also part of the Princelings (an elite clique consisting of high-ranking communist officials’ children and cronies), which has produced a number of military officials. Thus, the faction might have been a conduit through which he has made his connections to the armed services. 

Given this, he has the potential to more quickly consolidate his power within the armed forces. But the problem for him is that Hu has already finished promoting high-level generals. So, for the next two years or so, Xi may not be able to carry out a military reshuffle. To put it simply, for the time being, Xi may lead the military, encircled by top officers appointed by Hu. 

KH: How do you think the Sino-American rivalry will unfold?

Kim: The swings between conflict and cooperation will be much greater, more dramatic, I suppose. What Xi wants is a new great-power relationship. He wants to establish a mutually beneficial relationship based more on fairness. He has already suggested it to the U.S. Now, the question is to what extent the U.S. can accept it. It won’t, of course, be easy.

Given his personality and disposition, as I explained earlier, bilateral conflict, should it occur, could get more serious than before. But, again, he could also try to reverse the stalemate in a dramatic way. What is evident is the two countries would not take a road of mutual destruction given that the 21st century is diametrically different from the 20th century, and war between great powers is inconceivable. This is the bottom line.

But neither side will want to recognize the other’s hegemony. During Xi’s presidency for the next decade, China is expected to surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy, while the U.S. may continue to hold the No. 1 position in terms of military might. The two nations are at this intersection. 

In addition to this, the Chinese leadership will face considerable pressure amid people’s democratic aspirations. Under these circumstances, Beijing may find it difficult to give in (to the intensifying rivalry with the U.S.) It could tamp down or quash (such popular aspirations) if it is an autocratic, authoritarian regime. But employing this method will become increasingly difficult.

For example, when there are territorial disputes, the Chinese leadership may not easily back down as it could lead to a leadership crisis compounded by rising democratic voices. Beijing, thus, could take quite a strong stance. But the way it seeks to untangle it could also be dramatic.

KH: How do you think China will respond to the call by the U.S. to “play by the rules”?

Kim: China might call for reasonable readjustments. It will demand that, commensurate with its enhanced international standing and economic scale, its authority be increased. The U.S., on the contrary, may stress China’s responsibility, demanding that China should make more global contributions. Thus, the question is how to compromise. This is crucial, but may not be easy. It is because China may find it difficult to push for costly policies when facing social and economic challenges in this transitional period.

KH: How do you think things will change about 15 years from now in terms of America’s power projection in the Asia-Pacific? This is the period during which Washington will cut its defense spending to reduce the fiscal deficit.

Kim: What Xi is strongly calling for is to forge a new relationship between major powers. This means, after all, (China) calls on the U.S. to reasonably accept the change in China’s global influence in line with its newfound strength. For this, the U.S. now faces a considerable dilemma.

Part of the reason for the U.S. to curtail defense spending may be America’s decline is feared to be accelerated amid its economic challenges. It may be a desperate attempt by Washington to manage the current balance of power through reasonable readjustments.

In tune with this, the U.S. may call on its allies ― South Korea and Japan ― to make more contributions, and seek to forestall or delay any unfavorable situation where the balance of power in the region could be broken. The next decade or about 15 years … this period will be a very unstable one.

KH: The U.S. has refocused on the Asia-Pacific ― the so-called pivot toward the economically vibrant region. It has also introduced a new strategic military guidance to deal with what it calls China’s anti-access/area-denial strategy. Do these moves, to a certain degree, reflect America’s apprehension about its relative, regional decline?

Kim: According to an international relations theory, unless the U.S. demonstrates its strength and will to defend (its allies and partners), they are likely to cooperate with the country that poses a potential threat to them ― what theorists call “bandwagoning behavior.” In other words, there is a possibility that its neighbors could quickly fall into the sphere of China’s influence. Thus, the U.S. needs to show its capability to balance power and present a strong presence and leadership. This is what they call “rebalancing.” It is like the U.S. saying that neighboring states had better not bandwagon (on China) as they could rather pay the price for that. It (rebalancing) can be seen as a strategy to prevent or delay the “power transition” phenomena in the region, or stall for time, when America’s power stands still or is relatively waning, while the other (China)’s power is increasing. 

KH: How do you assess China’s handling of maritime disputes in the South China Sea? Should we take it as China’s efforts to secure its sea lines of communication or sort of an expansionist attempt that could possibly encroach upon others?

Kim: Could be both (from outsiders’ perspectives). Its natural process of expanding (its influence) could cause misunderstandings, whether intended it or not, or could produce (unintended expansionist) outcomes. 

But what China may feel frustrated about would be outsiders’ interpretation of the double-digit increase in its defense spending. Some argue that this is an enormous increase, based on which, they say China’s external, security policy appears to be aggressive, expansionist, and even in pursuit of hegemonic power. 

From China’s perspective, the country’s defense spending is a little below the average of its government expenditures for other realms. Though it is measured by its own standards, the increase rate of defense spending also hovers around the average rate, and this means they have more room to set aside more resources to the military. In other words, we have to look at the increase in defense spending not as a variable but a constant. Given its economic size, this amount of spending, in some senses, is only natural and normal. But neighboring states apparently feel threatened, irrespective of China’s true intentions. Through strategic communication between China and the U.S., and China and neighboring states, they continue to work together to address their misunderstandings and misgivings. China, for its part, should recognize how its bolstered military could threaten its neighbors. 

KH: Do you see any possible change in China’s North Korea policy under Xi?

Kim: There may not be many changes. Making a change in its external policy is not easy in fact. Plus, from China’s point of view, what is best is to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula, and strengthen its influence over both South and North Korea. In this regard, it could seek to have good ties with both and may refrain from provoking the South by unilaterally taking the side of the North while highlighting its closer ideological affinity toward Pyongyang. Instead, it will try to block any instability in the North, try to persuade it to move toward openness and reform, and finally disarm itself in a way that would not cause any instability to China. In the process, it will also try to avoid any conflict with the U.S.





Kim Heung-kyu

● Kim Heung-kyu, a political science and diplomacy professor at Sungshin Women’s University, is a leading expert in Chinese politics, foreign policy and overall security issues concerning Northeast Asia.

● Kim has authored more than 100 articles, books and policy papers on these issues. Among them are “Chinese Decision-making and Democratic Centralism (2004),” “The Politics of Fiscal Standardization in China: Fiscal Contract vs. Tax Assignment (2004)” and “The Anti-Secession Law and Taiwan Straits Relations (2005).”

● Kim formerly served as professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for five years and as an advisory member to the Presidential Security Council and a regular participant at the Republic of Korea-China Strategic Dialogues.

● He earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in international relations from Seoul National University and a doctorate in political science from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.

By Song Sang-ho (sshluck@heraldcorp.com)

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